

## Community resources

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## Viewing cable 09STATE95585,

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### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09STATE95585**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">09STATE95585</a>	<a href="#">2009-09-15 12:48</a>	<a href="#">2011-08-30 01:44</a>	<a href="#">CONFIDENTIAL</a>	<a href="#">Secretary of State</a>

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4025427.ece>

VZCZCXRO5927  
OO RUEHSL  
DE RUEHC #5585/01 2581307  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 151248Z SEP 09  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 2317  
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 3649  
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 095585  
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2019

TAGS: [NATO](#) [PREL](#) [RU](#)

REF: USNATO 383

Classified By: EUR PDAS Nancy McEldowney for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

[¶1.](#) (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 3.

[¶2.](#) (C) Summary. As part of his efforts to revitalize NATO-Russia relations, NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen intends to deliver a major speech on Russia September 18 at the Carnegie Europe Center. There are concerns that SecGen intends to announce Alliance initiatives that have yet to be agreed upon by Allies and

go beyond most Allies comfort zones, including possible official NATO engagement with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)" (ref A). By unilaterally announcing new initiatives on behalf of the Alliance, SecGen risks undermining the Alliances consensus-driven approach to policy in an area where we have taken great pains to find a delicate balance. Department requests that Ambassador Daalder raise privately with SecGen the concerns outlined in paragraph 3 prior to SecGens speech, while emphasizing U.S. support for several areas of NATO-Russia cooperation (additional thoughts on NRC cooperation coming septel). End Summary.

13. (C) The Ambassador should draw on the following points to raise privately with Secretary General Rasmussen. Begin points:

-- Washington shares your goal of improving NATO-Russia relations; this is why we are focused on reaching agreement on the "Taking the NRC Forward" paper in order to outline priorities for future cooperation and improve the NRCs effectiveness through structural reform.

-- However, NATO decisions can only be taken by consensus. Failure to forge consensus among Allies prior to taking public positions undermines this consensus-based approach and runs the risk of sowing division within the Alliance, as well as between PfP nations in Central Asia and NATO. Allies voice and your voice as Secretary General will both be stronger if they are in unison.

-- In your speech at the Carnegie Europe Center on September 18, we strongly urge you not to get ahead of Allies deliberations by announcing new NATO-Russia initiatives that have yet to be formally considered by the Alliance.

-- In this vein, it would be premature to announce that NATO will begin official contacts with the CSTO. NATO has yet to formally discuss, let alone agree to, engagement with the CSTO. This will certainly require extensive review in many Allied capitals. Washington is currently reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of CSTO engagement in order to contribute to an informed debate when Allies do in fact begin discussions on this policy.

-- We also encourage you to refrain from publicly calling for contingency planning. While the United States supports contingency planning, this is a matter of extreme sensitivity to many Allies, and we cannot take any decisions on this set of issues before consultations have run their course. We anticipate that the role of contingency planning, and the specific plans that are needed given the current security environment, will be central issues of discussion as we develop NATOs new Strategic Concept. This is a matter of extreme sensitivity to many Allies, and we cannot take any decisions on this set of issues before consultations have run their course.

-- Similarly, we believe that visiting Allied capitals before Moscow would benefit consensus building among all Allies and strengthen the relationship between Allies and the International Staff. Some Allies, the Baltic states in particular, have privately expressed to us their concerns about the optics of a trip to Russia prior to visiting their capitals.

-- Your speech on Friday presents an important opportunity to highlight areas Allies have identified for future NRC cooperation. Allies agree on the need to revitalize the NATO-Russia Council and are actively working on giving the NRC new shape and substance, an important public relations point in and of itself. We strongly recommend that your remarks reflect Allied consensus.

-- Thus, we urge you to tailor your remarks to emphasize growing practical coordination between the Alliance and Russia in specific areas within the NATO-Russia Council, including in

Afghanistan; counter-narcotics projects in Afghanistan and Central Asia; efforts to address the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear material; counter-piracy in and beyond the Horn of Africa; and counter-terrorism.

End Points.

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